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Abstract
Social engineering is now a major threat to users and systems in the online context, and it is therefore vital to educate
potential victims in order to reduce their susceptibility to the related attacks. However, as with other aspects of security
education, this firstly requires a means of getting the user’s attention. This paper presents details of an awarenessraising game that was developed in order to educate users in a more interactive way. A board game approach,
combining reference material with themed multiple-choice questions, was implemented as an initial prototype, and
evaluated with 21 users. The results suggested that the approach helped to increase players’ awareness of social
engineering, with nobody scoring under 55% whilst playing the game, and 86% feeling they had improved their
knowledge of the subjects involved.
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INTRODUCTION
User awareness represents a significant challenge in the security domain, with the human factor ultimately being the
element that is exploited in a variety of attack scenarios. This is most clearly illustrated with attacks focusing around
social engineering techniques, in which the users’ naivety, gullibility and simple good nature can often be leveraged to
the benefit of an attacker. However, raising awareness of security issues in a manner that engages with users is not easy,
and it is certainly true that simply providing advice and instruction in traditional forms can be less than effective. As an
example, a survey of over 1,280 business users revealed that while 97% agreed that every individual in their organisation
is responsible for security, a significantly lower proportion (72%) had read and understood their organisation's security
policy (SAI Global, 2008). In many cases, the problems may relate to the manner in which security is promoted to users,
with other survey evidence suggesting that the most common approaches are via handbooks, face-to-face training and
induction programmes, with techniques such as computer-based training being used in a small minority of cases (BERR,
2008).
Recognising both the threat to users and potential benefits of addressing the audience in a different way, this paper
summarises a project that was undertaken to improve user awareness of social engineering attacks in online contexts. In
order to provide a more engaging means of interaction, the decision was taken to present related materials in the context
of a game, in which users could both explore and be tested on topics of relevance (thus hopefully providing a more
interesting way to learn).
The sections that follow begin by presenting background information on the social engineering threats targeted by the
game, followed by a description of the game prototype itself, including the reasoning behind the decisions that were
made, as well as explaining the defined requirements. Finally, discussion is devoted to the user evaluation of the
prototype, and the results that were obtained from this.

ONLINE SOCIAL ENGINEERING THREATS
Social engineering in an IT context is based upon targeting the individual rather than directly attacking their system, and
refers to techniques that exploit human weaknesses and manipulate people into breaking normal security procedures
(ENISA, 2008). The attacker uses psychology to trick the user, convincing them to perform atypical actions or to divulge
confidential information. Whilst social engineering did not originate from IT, the frequency of related attacks occurring
in this context has increased significantly, especially with techniques such as phishing. As a consequence, a veritable
goldmine has opened up for attackers, with millions of potential victims a single mouse click away.
There are a number of different types of social engineering attacks, and the remainder of this section will give an
overview of these exploits, including looking at how they have evolved with new technology.
The most frequent type of social engineering attack is phishing (APWG, 2009). This typically involves an email from the
attacker imitating an organisation such as banks in an attempt to trick the user into following a link and entering their
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details. According to research carried out by Gartner (2007), between August 2006 and August 2007 3.6 million users
lost money to phishing scams in the US, resulting in a combined loss of $3.2million, which indicates the scale of the
problem.
Certain spam can be classed as a social engineering attacks as many offer enticements such as free images, a movie or
friendship, with the aim of provoking intrigue and interest from the user. However, the related links or attachments often
lead to malware, with the consequence that the user may be tricked into inviting damage to their system and data.
Another form of social engineering attack is advance fee fraud (also known as the 419 scam), in which an attacker
usually exploits human greed or sympathy. When exploiting greed, the attacker suggests to the victim that they will get a
large amount of money for sending a small amount of money first, usually explained as a release fee, bribe or legal fee.
Other forms of this attack can consist of the attacker imitating a victim of a recent natural disaster – trying to exploit the
reader’s sympathy. Although most recipients of the emails do not respond there will always be a small but tangible
proportion that does.
The perpetrators of these attacks are highly versatile when it comes to making use of new opportunities. The increase in
the popularity of social networking sites has meant that targeted ‘spear phishing’ attacks are easier to carry out, with
attackers making use of information that is freely available on these sites and targeting potential victims specifically via
email, including some of the user’s personal information to make the attempt look more convincing and authentic.
In view of the above, it is clear that users require support and awareness in order to protect themselves. Although a
number of online sources exist if people are prepared to look for them, many are non-interactive and rely upon people
having the interest and dedication to read the materials purely for their own sake. As such, dressing the awareness raising
in a more enjoyable context could provide a means to reach users who may not otherwise have the dedication to
investigate the topics for themselves. It was therefore decided that an educational, interactive application would be a
good way to proceed, aiming the at everyday users (i.e. not overly technical or complicated) with the intention of making
their learning more palatable than just reading pages of text. There are already examples of such approaches to be found,
with a particularly good one being the Anti-Phishing Phil game from Carnegie Mellon University (Sheng et al. 2007).
However. while phishing is currently the most common social engineering attack it is not the only one and there appears
to be scope for further solutions aimed at the other forms of attacks.

BOARD GAME PROTOTYPE
There were a number of possibilities for the form of game to be developed, with early ideas including a role-playing
game (RPG) that would enable the user to take control of a character and navigate through an area in order to achieve the
main goal that would have been centred on answering questions and gaining knowledge. However, due to the fairly small
development window available, the decision was taken to pursue a more straightforward board game approach. This
would have accompanying website literature that could be referred to should the user be unable to answer a question,
allowing an interactive way to learn rather than simply reading materials without a task to focus upon. The main aim was
to develop a working prototype that could be evaluated and then further developed within follow-on research.
It was important that the game was fairly simplistic in terms of how it would be played as the aim of this was to educate
users, not to require them to read pages of instructions informing them of how to play the game. A board game ensured
that the solution would be easy to understand and therefore maximise time to educate the user whilst still having an
interactive interface.
The board included 32 squares, with each assigned to one of four social engineering topics (with the named categories
being phishing, advance fee fraud and spam, along with a fourth category labelled ‘other’, which addressed the less
common attacks). Each category was represented by a different colour on the game board (e.g. phishing was red and
advance fee fraud was yellow), with the number of times each colour appears on the board being pre-determined by the
extent of the threat concerned. For example, as phishing was identified as one of the most damaging form of social
engineering, red squares appear more frequently than the advance fee fraud questions.
For the quiz element, a multiple-choice format was selected as it was felt to provide an effective way to pose questions
and collect users’ responses. For the prototype, simple text-based presentation was used for the options, but further
development would permit the same multiple-choice approach to be used in conjunction with questions involving images
and/or audio/video content.
The player's score is tracked throughout the game in order to provide an extra level of motivation to the user, and thus
increase their knowledge and education. Although not implemented in the prototype, a high score feature would represent
an easy addition, and could be further extended to track scores in a multiplayer context.
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Rather than being a straight forward ‘roll and move forward’ type of game, the option to move back was added. Upon
rolling, all squares were to dim, with the available squares staying lit. Whilst this offered nothing other than a minor
addition to gameplay, it was felt it was adding something that could be more useful in a later development. For example,
if a ‘bonus’ square was added in a future version, the option to move backwards may allow for the user to get there
quicker. This reasoning would also be the same if there were other targets to achieve, (for example, if they were given the
task of answering a certain number of phishing questions within a set time).
The following steps outline the general game flow, indicating how the operations work from the users’ perspective:
1.

Upon opening the game the user is greeted with the main menu. From here they can view the instructions and
click ‘start game’ or just click ‘start game’ without reading viewing the instructions.

2.

The user enters their name, selects their piece, and clicks ‘submit’.

3.

Upon submitting their name and piece, the game begins (see Figure 1). The user clicks ‘start’ to begin the dice
animation, upon clicking ‘stop’ the selector stops.

4.

With a number selected, all squares are dimmed, with the two possible movable squares staying lit.

5.

Upon choosing a square the user’s piece is moved to the chosen location and a question is asked (see Figure 2)

6.

The user then selects an answer and feedback is immediately provided.

7.

Depending on whether the user gets the answer right or wrong, the square deactivates and contains a tick or a
cross.

8.

Upon answering all questions, or clicking the ‘quit’ button, the user is given their score and can either close the
game completely, or click ‘finish’ which will take them back to the main menu.

Figure 1 - The main game board
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Figure 2 - Question Interface

USER EVALUATION
In conducting an evaluation, the intention was to recruit users with varying levels of existing knowledge in the area.
Although the solution assumed very little knowledge in the subject area, ideally it would be beneficial to the majority of
users and so it was vital to ensure that the test participants represented a range of user ability. 35 requests for user testing
were sent, with 21 users ultimately carrying out the test. 14 of the participants were male, with 7 female. In relation to
age, 2 were 18 or under, 12 were 19-25, 3 were 26-35, 1 was 36-45 and 3 were aged 45+.
The solution was tested by asking the users three preliminary questions to find the length of time they spend on the
Internet every week and their current knowledge in the subject area. They were then asked read through the online
material once, and then play through the game whilst referring to the literature if necessary. They then resumed the
questionnaire and were asked to provide their score, overall feelings on the game and literature and their
recommendations for future development which was vital with this being a prototype.
Figure 3 shows the relation between time spent online and the achieved score. It would be expected that the longer
someone spends on the Internet, the better score they would achieve. As seen below this seemed to be generally the case.
As the solution is aimed at every day Internet users, the users at the lower end of the Internet usage were not expected to
get poor scores as it was ensured that the material was aimed for a range of users. This seems to be shown below, with
the lowest score achieved being 450 which is approximately 56% from someone who spends very little time on the
Internet.

Figure 3 - The relationship between time spent on the Internet and score
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Following their evaluation of the game, participants were asked to indicate whether they felt they had learned something
as a result. In the vast majority of cases (86%) the users reported that their awareness of social engineering had
improved, with the underlying responses recorded as follows:


29% felt more aware of the dangers to the point that they felt comfortable to deal with the problem;



38% felt more aware of the dangers and wanted to find out more information;



19% felt more aware but did not want to look at anything else;



14% did not feel more aware and felt that nothing was new to them.

The testing results suggested that the prototype was successful as an awareness-raising tool. In addition, 17 out of 21 of
the test participants found the level of website literature suitable, with 18 of them satisfied with the question levels in the
game.
Having played the game, participants were asked about factors that it might be useful to see addressed as part of future
development. Figure 4 summarises the feedback in this respect. Improved graphics was the most popular option. There
are various ways in which this could be developed in the future, including a more aesthetically pleasing board layout
rather than the coloured squares in the prototype. Indeed, further development work since the user evaluation has already
begun to revise and enhance this aspect, and an example of the revised main game board is shown in Figure 5 (noting
that the SP shown in the shield refers to ‘Security Pursuit’, the working title of the game).

Figure 4 - Features desired in future developments
The second most popular feature was a high score board, which as well as adding a user requested element to the game,
may also be a way of retaining the users attention, with a goal for themselves of getting on the high score board they are
less likely to become bored. It may also tempt the user to replay the game.
Different question formats was the third most popular feature. This could include things such as displaying four emails to
the user, and have them select the email that is a social engineering attack. An alternative to this could be displaying a
single email and have the user select the ‘hotspots’ that would suggest that it is a social engineering attack.
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Figure 5- The revised main game board

CONCLUSION
User awareness has a fundamental role to play in maintaining the security of systems and data. Providing support in an
engaging and enjoyable manner increases the chances of users taking part and the key information being retained.
The board game approach presented in this paper was considered to meet the criteria of being interactive, and combining
the game with reference literature was thought to make the digestion of the latter more enjoyable than simply reading
static text. Whilst it was accepted that only offering multiple-choice questions was not ideal, it was a realistic starting
point for an initial version of the game.
It can be seen that with the prototype showing potential, if the additional developments are implemented in a future
development, participation should increase and ideally so will the awareness levels of those who play.

REFERENCES
APWG. 2009. Phishing Activity Trends Report, 1st Half 2009, Anti-Phishing Working Group, January-June 2009,
http://www.apwg.org/reports/apwg_report_h1_2009.pdf (accessed 30 September 2009).
Bennet et al. Object Oriented Analysis and Design. 2nd Ed. London. McGraw-Hill.
BERR. 2008. 2008 Information Security Breaches Survey – Technical Report, Department for Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform, April 2008, URN 08/788.
ENISA. 2008. Social Engineering: Exploiting the Weakest Links. Whitepaper, European Network and Information
Security Agency, October 2008. http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/ar/deliverables/2008/social-engineering (accessed
30 September 2009).
Gartner. 2007. Gartner Survey Shows Phishing Attacks Escalated in 2007. Press release, 17 December 2007.
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=565125 (accessed 30 September 2009).
SAI Global. 2008. SAI Global Information Security Awareness Survey 2008. http://www.saiglobal.com.

29| P a g e

Proceedings of the 7th Australian Information Security Management Conference
Sheng, S., Magnien, B,, Kumaraguru, P., Acquisti, A., Cranor, L., Hong, J. and Nunge. E. 2007. “Anti-Phishing Phil: The
Design and Evaluation of a Game That Teaches People Not to Fall for Phish”, in Proceedings of the 2007
Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security, Pittsburgh, PA, 18-20 July 2007.

COPYRIGHT
Michael Newbould & Stephen Furnell ©2009. The author/s assign the Security Research Centre (SECAU) & Edith
Cowan University a non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full
and this copyright statement is reproduced. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to SECAU & ECU to publish
this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CDROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. Any other usage is prohibited without the express
permission of the authors

30| P a g e

